IRG4 has examined the globalization of nanotechnology, focusing initially on China, then expanding to a comparative analysis that includes the United States and Japan. This research has embraced a variety of methodologies – primarily field research in China (some 60 interviews during 5 weeks of fieldwork), but also including bibliometric analysis of Chinese co-authored nanotechnology-related publications in SCI journals, an analysis of Chinese nanotechnology patents, and an examination of English- and Chinese-language documents and websites. IRG 4 published or submitted 8 items; gave more than two dozen talks at professional meetings and conferences in the United States, Canada, Taiwan, and Germany; organized a panel at the 2007 AAAS meetings; and organized an international conference on Nanotechnology Occupational Safety and Health in Laboratories and Workplaces (UCSB, 2007). In March 2009 Appelbaum testified on this work as an expert witness before the U.S.-China Economic Security Commission in Washington, D.C.; he was a lead presenter at Woodrow Wilson on Nanotech in China in Feb 2007.
IRG 4 comprises: Richard Appelbaum , Leader, Sociology/Global Studies, UC Santa Barbara; Gary Gereffi, Sociology, Duke University; Tim Lenoir , History, Duke University; Cynthia Cannady, International Law, Private sector; Cong Cao , Sociology/China, SUNY-Levin Institute; Brad Chmelka , Chemical Engineering, UCSB; Tim Cheng , Chemical Engineering, UCSB; Vladi Finotto , Economics, Venice International Univ; Patrick Herron , Computer science, Duke University; Stefano Micella, Economics, Venice International Univ., as well as 1 Post-doc, 3 SS grads, 2 NSE grads, 3 undergrads, 3 technical.
Research Projects: The primary focus of this phase has been to better understand the interplay of national and transnational forces in shaping the development of nanotechnology, with initial focus on China. At the national level, science and technology policy has been a driver of nanotechnology, with many countries (including China) modeling their approach on the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative. China, however, has pushed governmental support further towards the commercial end of the innovation/commercialization continuum, in an effort to become globally competitive. Yet at the same time, nanotechnology R&D is highly globalized, through international collaborations, conferences, and institutional cooperative agreements. IRG 4’s research has sought to better understand this tension between national and transnational forces.
IRG 4-1 Nanotechnology and Comparative Industrial Policy. (Appelbaum, Leader; Gereffi, Parker, Motoyama, Ridge, Micelli, Finotto) Like many countries involved in catch-up development, China is convinced that manufacturing prowess alone is insufficient to make them a leading economic power in the 21st century. One of China’s overarching goals is to become an “innovationdriven society” by 2020. It plans to do so by “leapfrogging development,” a phrase used explicitly by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) to describe its plan to “aim at the forefront of world technology development.” Our research examines China’s industrial policy, concluding that although China’s efforts to speed nanotechnology commercialization have thus far had mixed results, significant advances have been made in some areas, such as the development of nanomaterials (Appelbaum, et al. forthcoming). By way of comparison, our Italian collaborators Micelli and Finotto have found that government efforts there in the Veneto Nanodistrict have had limited success, since Italian consumers are more concerned with style than the material function of products. We are in the initial stages of expanding our research to a comparison with the U.S. and Japan (Motoyama). Additionally, we have done some initial analysis of nanotechnology development in India, focusing in particular on the area of nanoporous filtration for clean water (Parker).
IRG 4-2: Leapfrog Development in China (Appelbaum; Gereffi, Cao, Parker)
China is racing toward high-technology development, while continuing to exploit its comparative advantage in laborintensive industries. In doing so, China – and by implication other developing countries, if they follow China’s example – could potentially prompt considerable shifts in the global economy. What makes China unique, however, is its attempt to combine its low-cost advantage in export-oriented industrialization, its large domestic market for advanced manufactures via import-substituting industrialization, and its burgeoning talent pool of scientists and engineers associated with the R&D process in high-technology development into a single development strategy. The choice of leapfrog development as a development strategy can only be explained by China’s expansive vision of its role as anemerging global power and its domestic politics oriented toward rapid economic growth.” Nanotechnology, which is one of four “science metaprojects” in China’s Medium and Long Term Plan for Technology Development, illustrates both the potential and difficulties of this leapfrogging strategy, which ultimately seeks to bypass the traditional movement up the value chain.
IRG 4-3: Chinese Nanotechnology Publications (Lenoir, Appelbaum, Herron, Parker).
China’s top-down and government-centered approach toward science and technology policy is succeeding in driving academic-publications output. By 2005 China had equaled or possibly surpassed the U.S. in terms of total output for academic/peer-reviewed publications, with a substantial increase in publication rate from around 2003. While others have illustrated that numbers do not translate into high impact, Esther Levy – editor of the journal Advanced Materials – indicated in an interview at the IMMA meeting at Fudan University (Shanghai) that the level of Chinese scholarship was improving, attributable in part to international collaborations as well as to the growing number of returning overseas Chinese. We examined US and Chinese nanotechnology trends in the scientific literature and found that Chinese nanotechnology output is growing rapidly and will likely US output in terms of quality as well as quantity within a decade or less (Appelbaum & Parker 2008).
IRG 4-4: Chinese Nanotechnology Patent Analysis. (Appelbaum; Cannady, Lenoir, Herron, Parker; data/analysis provided by Zhu. Our preliminary research in this area on nearly 19,000 Chinese nanotechnology patents from 1985-2007, indicates that Chinese patents in this field are coming from research institutions rather than the private sector. China is mainly following the historic U.S. innovation model of technology transfer: using massive government cash infusions into basic research clusters in order to stimulate new applied research and subsequent innovation/commercialization. The Chinese clearly understand patent power and strategy, and may well be poised to be dominant in nanotechnology-related platforms that affects many fields, and therefore could create de facto standards that enable them to extract licensing fees from foreign research institutions and businesses in the future. On the other hand, China may be refraining from public disclosure of recent nanotech-related inventions as a way to secure a head start; we have also heard reports that some key technologies are not patented for fear of intellectual piracy. Our research in this area is in its initial stage; we acquired the patent data late in 2008, and are currently working to clean and analyze the dataset.
IRG 4-5: (Nanotech) Solar Value Chain Analysis (Parker; Frederick, Gereffi, Bunch)
This preliminary project developed from a CNS summer internship project in 2008 and involves tracing the global value chain for the components of solar panels manufactured by a key Chinese solar company (Suntech, the world’s 4th-largest manufacturer of photovoltaics). The products of this company do not yet include 3rd generation (thin film nano-based) technology, but we expect that the results of our value chain analysis will serve as a proxy for understanding future commercialization.
IRG 4-6: Bio/pharma Nanotechnology Research in China. (Lenoir, Herron)
Chinese patents in this field originate at various research institutions, rather than the private sector. This fact is important to understand as a policy matter as it distinguishes the Chinese approach from European and other leading strategies. China is following the historic US linear innovation model of technology transfer: using massive government cash infusions into basic research clusters in order to stimulate new applied research and subsequent innovation/commercialization. Certain cluster areas appear to have been defined by the Chinese in nanotech. China may be poised to be dominant in a broad platform technology that affects many fields, and therefore could create a de facto standard, and extract rents (royalties) from US research institutions and businesses in the future. The lists of Chinese research institutions and inventors that apparently are active in this area are impressive and could be a base for further study. China may be refraining from public disclosure or translation of recent nanotech related inventions as a way to secure a head start (Lenoir and Herron 2008).
